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A Positive Theory of Strict Liability
KEITH N. HYLTON
Boston University*

In spite of its tenure as the prevaiing economic theor of strict §abiky, the proposition that strict iabiiy
should be preferred to negkgence when it is desirable to reduce injurers' actidy levels ratherthan victims'
activi levels raises afew questions. First, when should we prefer to reduce injurers'actid0y levels rather
than ictims'? Second, why should we not hold both victim and injurer strictly lable? This paper
provides a model that answers these questions more effectively than the prevalikg economic model. The
modelpresented here offers speaficpredictions that are consistent nith the detailedlaw on strict labiky
and the appearance of strict labiiy in pockets rather than as an across-the-boarddefault rule. The
choice between strict labiky and negkgence depends on the degree to which there is a reczrocal exchange
of risk among actors, and the extent to which benefits, in addition to risks, are externaZed.

1. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental parts of modern economic analysis of tort law is the
distinction between care and activity levels. One can reduce the likelihood of an
accident occurring by taking care or by reducing the level of activity. For
example, the likelihood of a car accident can be reduced by driving with greater
care - e.g., looking to both sides of the road more frequently or moderating the
speed - or by driving less frequently.
The distinction between care and activity levels was introduced and treated
informally in Calabresi (1970), and in Posner (1972), and received its first formal
treatment in Shavell (1980). Shavell concluded that "strict liability is preferable
to negligence if it is more desirable to control injurers' activity than victims'."
Landes and Posner (1987) applied this theory to explain the case law on strict
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liability. Posner applied the theory to analyze a strict liability claim in Indiana
HarborBelt Railroad Co. v. American CyanamidCo.'
In spite of its tenure as the prevailing economic theory, the proposition that
strict liability should be preferred to negligence when it is desirable to reduce
the activity levels of injurers rather than the activity levels of victims raises
several questions. When, precisely, should we prefer to reduce injurers' activity
levels rather than victims'? In the analysis of Shavell and in that of Landes and
Posner, this question is answered by the observation that the law on strict
liability seems to be consistent with the foregoing proposition. But the
proposition itself has no predictive value. Further, why should we not hold
both victim and injurer strictly liable? If strict liability serves the function of
inducing actors to take externalized costs into account in choosing their activity
levels, would it not be efficient to have a rule requiring both injurer and victim
to suffer a loss in the event of an accident?
This paper provides a simple model that answers these questions more
effectively, I contend, than the prevailing economic model. The model
presented here offers specific predictions which are consistent with tort law,
both in its general contours and details. Its predictions are consistent with the
law on strict liability and the appearance of strict liability in pockets rather than
as an across-the-board default rule.
At its core, the model in this paper examines the cross-externalization of risk
that occurs when actors are jointly engaged in a potentially harmful activity, such
as driving. The choice between strict liability and negligence depends on the
degree to which there is a reciprocal exchange of risk among the actors, in the
sense that the risks externalized by A to B are roughly the same as the risks
externalized by B to A. The key result is that strict liability is preferable to
negligence only when risks are nonreciprocal (or, equivalently, asymmetric) 2
When risks are nonreciprocal, the negligence rule encourages high risk
externalizers to expand their activities and low risk externalizers to contract their
activities, which magnifies losses. Strict liability leads to the opposite result, and is
therefore preferable to negligence when externalized risks are asymmetric.

1 916

F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
(1972) offers a corrective justice theory of tort law that concludes that strict liability
is appropriate when risks are nonreciprocal. The model in this paper formalizes an economic
theory that parallels fletcher's corrective justice account - and includes it as a special case of a
more general model. It also formalizes and extends the argument in Hylton (1996). In terms of
the economic literature on tort rules, one immediate implication of the "reciprocal risk"
condition is that the claim that strict liability affects activity levels while negligence does not is
incorrect even in the unilateral care case.
2 Fletcher
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Another key feature of this model is its incorporation of externalized benefits.
Because of externalized benefits, it may be socially desirable for the law to adopt a
negligence rule instead of a rule of strict liability - independent of risk reciprocity.
Moreover, in the absence of externalized benefits, liability rules would fail to bring
about optimal deterrence in the typical accident setting, which involves bilateral
risk.3 In order to fully internalize the risks that A and B cause by driving, both
should be required to pay for the costs of accidents between them. Since liability
rules fail to tax both of the participants to an accident, their incentives to engage
in activity would be excessive were it not for the existence of external benefits.
Incorporating external benefits enables this model to provide a positive account
for a larger sample of common law rules. In particular, when external benefits are
taken into account, doctrines limiting the duty to take care appear in this analysis
to be part of a spectrum of liability rules, including strict liability and negligence,
structured to optimally regulate activity levels.
By emphasizing externalization of risk and benefit, this paper returns to a
view of tort law that is suggested in the early common law cases and reaches its
clearest expression in Rylands v. Fletcher.4 The focus on externalization has been
displaced or supplanted in modern analyses by a focus on the ability to avoid
or control risk, an approach which was introduced by Calabresi. Examining the
ability to avoid or control risk rather than the tendency to externalize risk may
be better as an operational or normative theory of the function of tort law.
However, as Calabresi argued, the cheapest cost avoider theory appears not to
provide a robust theory of the common law of torts. The externalization-based
model presented here does provide a detailed rationale of common law tort
doctrine, and in this sense points the way toward a deeper understanding of the
function of specific tort doctrines.
Part 2 provides an intuitive account of the model in this paper. Part 3
presents the model and extensions. Part 4 applies the model to explain the
common law of torts. In terms of increasing strictness on potential tortfeasors,
the rules of tort law fall into no-duty rules, negligence rules, and strict liability
rules. The model of this paper provides an explanation for these general
categories as well as a rationale for specific doctrines within each category.

3 If two actors are imposing a risk of $10 on each other, internalizing external costs requires the
imposition of a $10 tax on both. See Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006).
4 Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866); Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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2. AN INTUITIVE ACCOUNT
In the model below, accidents occur in a setting in which risks are jointly
incurred or cross-externalized. Driving provides a simple and common
example. Suppose every driver takes care. Even though driver A takes care, he
still imposes some risk on other drivers, because even when A is taking care,
there is still a positive probability that he will crash his car into another driver.
If the chance of such an accident occurring is 1 out of every 1000 miles driven,
and the average harm imposed is $10,000, the expected value of the risk
externalized by A is $10 per mile. Given this scenario, the externalized risk
imposed on A by every other driver (within range to have an accident) is also
$10 per mile per driver.
In order to internalize these costs to drivers, some penalty must be applied
that forces each driver to incur a cost of $10 per mile. One approach would be
to apply a tax on driving. An alternative would be to include a tax on the
purchase of gasoline. However, most conventional liability rules will fail to
internalize the cost. Under strict liability, A would compensate B for the harm
imposed in an accident for which A is responsible, but B would pay nothing,
which is inadequate as a method of internalizing the activity cost of risk.5
Risk is not the only cost associated with the activity of driving. There is also
the cost of taking care, if the driver chooses to do so. There is also the direct
cost of capital exhaustion or depreciation of the car, and the time and physical
exhaustion costs of driving. However, capital depreciation and physical
exhaustion costs are borne directly by the driver, so there is no need to use a
liability rule to encourage him to take them into account.
This description of the standard accident setting is incomplete because it leaves
out external benefits. Activities sometimes cross-externalize benefits in addition
to risks. Return to the driving example. Having more than one driver on the road
often benefits the typical driver. One obvious example is safety from crime.
Highwaymen and pirates have existed for millennia primarily because they take
advantage of low-volume traffic routes. If the benefit externalized by each driver
is $10 per mile, it would fully offset the externalized risk, and there would be no
need to apply a corrective tax in order to reduce activity levels.
A key argument of this paper can be conveyed within this simple illustration.
One well established argument for strict liability is that it internalizes the costs
of activity risk and therefore provides incentives for actors to choose efficient
sI focus on representative drivers A and B to simplify the discussion. If we multiply the
number of drivers, while still assuming pairwise accidents, the presence of other drivers increases
the risk imposed on A, but also increases the risk A externalizes. I will return to this question in
the margins of the formal analysis.
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activity levels. But this argument is not generally valid in a setting of crossexternalization. Under strict liability, driver A externalizes $10 per mile and
pays for it, but he is compensated for the risk driver B imposes on him, which
is $10 per mile. Thus, the net cost of risk to A, as a component of the activity
costs incurred by A, is $10 per mile under strict liability. Under negligence,
driver A externalizes $10 of risk and does not pay for it (because he takes care).
However, he bears the cost that driver B imposes on him, which is $10 per
mile. Thus, the net cost of risk as a component of activity costs incurred by A
is $10 per mile under negligence. Since the costs of activity risk to A are the
same under both rules, there is no reason on deterrence grounds to choose
strict liability over negligence. Indeed, if people are more attentive to their own
injuries than to those of others for which they must pay, which seems a
reasonable assumption, switching from negligence to strict liability would lead
to greater externalization of the costs of activity risk.
One might argue that this is also a case in which there is no reason to control
the injurer's activity levels rather than the victim's. However, returning to the
argument of the introduction, why is it that there is no reason in this example
to control the injurer's activity level instead of the victim's? The answer is that
there is a reciprocal exchange of risk. This paper extends the Shavell-LandesPosner analysis by explicitly modeling the underlying factors that make it
desirable to regulate the activity of the injurer rather than that of the victim.
This explicit modeling, I show in the remainder, provides additional insights
into the common law of torts.

3. MODEL
The total number or frequency of injuries in this model is influenced by care
and activity levels. The likelihood of an injury occurring, for any given level of
activity, is simply a function of the level of care taken by the parties who might
be involved in an accident. To give a concrete example, suppose "the activity"
is driving an automobile. The likelihood of an accident involving two drivers
occurring at any moment is entirely a function of the level of care taken by the
two drivers. However, as more actors drive, more accidents are likely to result.
3.1. CARE
All actors are risk neutral. An actor can reduce the likelihood of injuring
someone in an accident by taking care, which is costly. I will assume that the
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likelihood that an actor causes an accident is a function of that actor's level of
care alone, 6 independent of the level of care or the activity level of other actors.
Let p, be the probability, per unit of activity, that actor i causes an injury to
another actor if actor i does not take care, pi > 0. Let qi be the probability, per
unit of activity, that actor i causes an injury if actor i does take care 0 < q < pi.
For example, if actor i is driving a car, qi would represent the probability that
actor icrashes his car into another driver even though actor iis driving carefully.7
This is a model of unilateral (or identifiable) causation and unilateral risk. This
can be contrasted with models of bilateral or unidentifiable causation in which
the probability that an accident occurs is simply a function of the care levels of
two or more parties.8 It can also be contrasted with models of bilateral risk,
e.g., Arlen (1992), in which both parties to every accident suffer injury. The
assumptions of unilateral risk and unilateral causation enable this model to
capture its key results with minimum complexity.9
Let v represent the loss (per unit of activity) that occurs as the result of an
accident, and x represent both the level and the cost of taking care per unit of
activity. Assume, to simplify further, that an actor can choose one of only two
possible care levels. One is "no care", which is x = 0. The other is "reasonable
care", which is x = xr. I will assume that x, + qv < pv, which means that
reasonable care is both privately and socially desirable.
6 The explicit incorporation of causal considerations is one feature distinguishing this model
from that of Shavell (1980).
7 Of course, cause is an imprecise term. One could say that the victim B caused the car accident
by being in the place to which A veered his car. However, the more intuitive sense of cause
implies some direct action on one actor's part that deviates from the norm and leads to contact
with another person. See Epstein (1972).
8 Most of the models examined in the literature, starting perhaps with Diamond (1974), can be
described as bilateral causation models. For example, in Shavell (1980) and in Arlen (1992) the
probability of an accident is a function of the level of care of both injurer and victim. In that
specification, causation is not easily traceable, and so it makes sense to speak of an accident
occurring without reference to an identifiable cause. I refer to an actor "causing" an accident in
this model because the occurrence of an accident is traceable to an identifiable actor. In addition,
in Arlen (1992), both parties are injured as a result of an accident, making it a model of bilateral
risk. In this paper's model, only one party suffers harm in accident caused by another, making it
a model of unilateral risk as well as unilateral causation.
9 I am aware of no other models that explore unilateral causation in a setting in which both
parties can cause an accident. The standard approach in unilateral causation models is to assume
that only one party (typically the injurer) can cause an accident, see, e.g., Hylton (1990) for such
an approach. In addition to the tractability advantage of the unilateral causation assumption, it is
my impression from teaching tort law that the unilateral causation model captures the implicit
assumptions held by the courts that decide tort cases. It should be easier within a model whose
mathematical foundations mirror the implicit assumptions of courts to generate predictions that
match the decisions of the courts.
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There are two representative actors A and B. If both take care, an accident can
occur in three ways. One way is that both actors cause the accident, in which case
the likelihood of injury (to both actors) is qAqB. Another way is that A causes the
accident while B does not, qA(l- qE), in which case B is injured and A is not
injured. The third way is that B causes the injury while A does not, qB(l- qA). The
same three causal pathways just described apply to the cases in which A takes care
and B does not, and the remaining two cases (B takes care, A does not; neither A
nor B take care). This generates twelve causal pathways to consider. However, we
will not need to consider all of them in the core part of this paper, which
examines incentives affecting activity level choices.
Litigation is assumed to be costless and courts operate without error.1 0 Since
all victims of accidents will sue and prevail in court, an actor will take
reasonable care whenever the incremental liability that he incurs by failing to
take care exceeds the cost of reasonable care x,.
Under a rule of strict abityfor causing harm, the actor will be held strictly liable
- that is, liable whether or not he took reasonable care - whenever he causes
harm to another actor. For simplicity, I will refer to this liability rule as stric
Rabi§ty. Suppose B takes care and A does not take care. A's expected cost
under this scenario is
(1) pAqB [(v-v) + V] +PA(> qB)[0+v]+ (1-pA)qB[(v-v) + 0] + (1-PA)(- qB)[0+0]

which is equal to pAv. The first term in (1) shows the case in which both parties
cause harm, while only B takes care. In that case, A is compensated for his own
harm (v-v) and must compensate B for the harm he suffers. In the second case,
A causes harm to B, while B takes care and does not cause harm to A. In the
third case, A does not take care and does not cause harm to B, while B takes
care and causes harm to A (for which A is compensated). In the last case,
neither party causes harm. The same accounting exercise leads to the
conclusion that when B takes care and A takes care, A's expected cost is equal
to qv. Moreover, the same results hold for the scenarios in which B does not
take care: the incremental liability to A for failing to take care is (tA - qA) v.
It follows from the foregoing that a sufficient condition for either actor to
take care is x, + qv < pv, which has been assumed to hold. Thus, actors take
reasonable care under strict liability. Moreover, it follows that actors will take
reasonable care under a rule of liability for neghgenty causing harm - or, simply,

neghgence. The reason is that the incremental liability for failing to take care
10 When litigation is costly and judicial error possible, many of the results of analyses that
assume costless and error-free litigation are modified, see Hylton (1990). Landes and Posner
(1987) incorporate litigation costs into their analysis informally.
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1221
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under strict liability is (Pi - q) v, while incremental liability for failing to take care
under negligence is pt. Since incremental liability is larger under negligence, the
assumption that x, < (p,- q)v implies that actors take care under negligence. In
addition, it also follows that actors will take care under either the strict liability
or the negligence rule when there is a defense of contributory negligence added
to the rule (Brown, 1973; Haddock and Curran, 1985).
What has been demonstrated to this point is that in a model of unilateral
causation of harm, with discrete care choices, actors will take reasonable care as
long as the incremental liability for failing to take care exceeds the cost of
taking care."

3.2.

ACTIVITY

A representative actor's activity level is given byp. The total cost of engaging in
an activity is the activity level,y, multiplied by the cost per unit of the activity,
C y). Similarly, the total benefit from engaging in an activity is equal to the
activity level,y, multiplied by the benefit per unit of activity B&).
Activities are assumed to be jointly-engaged or commingled in the sense that
some of the costs and some of the benefits of an actor's activity are
externalized to other actors. If an actor increases the level of his activity, he
may increase the risk that another actor will suffer an injury. For example, a
decision by A to drive more frequently increases the risk that another driver B
will be injured. However, there are benefits that may be externalized too. A
decision by A to drive more frequently may provide a benefit to B, perhaps by
reducing the need for B to drive or by increasing the security that B perceives
since B will not be on the road alone.
From the foregoing, it should be clear that we can distinguish between the private
and social costs of an activity. Let Cscy) represent the social cost per unit of
activity, and let C2u 2 (y) represent the private cost to the actor per unit of activity.
The social cost of activity is made up of several parts. First, there is the cost
of taking care, per unit of activity, x,. Second, there is the depreciation or
capital exhaustion that occurs as a byproduct of any activity. For example, the
activity of driving involves wear-and-tear on one's car. Of course, capital
exhaustion could include the physical exhaustion or disutility of devoting

11 This result may seem hard to reconcile on intuitive grounds with the notion that strict liability
dilutes the incentives of potential accident victims to take care. This effect is not observed in this
model because of the model's assumption of unilaterally caused harm. The victim's care has no
effect on the likelihood that he will be harmed, only on the likelihood that he harms someone else.
The model could be made more complicated by incorporating bilateral harm in each accident. But
this would complicate matters without disturbing the key results of this model.
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longer hours to a given activity. Let the depreciation component be given by
8() > 0, where 8'(y) > 0 and 8"(y)
0. The third component is the cost of
accidents; in the form of losses suffered by the actor and others.
Given the relationship between the cost of care and the marginal liability
from failing to take care, both A and B take care. Of course, even though both
A and B are taking care, accidents still happen. Since accidents can be caused
by A or by B, the socialcost of either actor's activity is' 2
(2)

y Csoc(y) = y(x, + 6(y) + qA(1-

(3)

= y(x, + 6(y) + qAv +

qB)v +

(1-

qA)qBv +

2

qAqBv)

qBV)

The private cost of activity differs from the social cost (equation (3)) because
it takes into account only the costs borne by the actor whose activity level is
being measured. These would include direct losses and the cost of liability
judgments against the actor. Since the private cost depends on the legal rule,
specifically whether it is one of strict liability or negligence, it will be specified
later in this paper.
Recall that the benefit per unit of an activity is B(y). The total benefit from
engaging in an activity is thereforepB(y). The benefit from an activity depends
on so many factors, such as individual tastes, that it cannot be specified with
the same detail as the cost. However, the benefit can be separated into private
and social benefits - or private and external components. If the probability of a
benefit being conferred on another is w, and Z is the benefit per unit of activity,
(4)

yBsoc(y) = y(b(y) +

wAZ + WBZ),

where b(y) > 0, b'(y) < 0, b"(y) 0. The assumption b(y) is decreasing reflects an
underlying assumption of declining marginal utility from additional activity.
The socially optimal level of activity equates the marginal social cost of an
activity with its marginal social benefit. Thus, the socially optimal activity level
satisfies
(5)

x, +

6(y) + qAv +

qBV + y'(y*) =

b(y*)

+ WAZ + WBZ +

y'b'(y*).

12 Suppose instead of two representative actors, we have three (still assuming pairwise
accidents). Then the risks imposed on A by both of the other two drivers must be taken into
account in expression (3). However, in this scenario A will impose risk on both of the other two
N-1

drivers. If there are N-1 other drivers, the activity risk factor becomes:
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y

(qA

B,)

b(y) + yb'(y)

y

y

Figure 1: Socially Optimal Level of Activity
Figure 1 illustrates the socially optimal activity level p>* The risk externality
component (qA + qB) v and the benefit externality component ()PA + n'B) Z are
both shown as vertical shifts in Figure 1. If there were no externalized benefits,
the marginal social benefit of activity would be the lower downward-sloping
curve in Figure 1; similarly, if there were no externalized risks, the marginal
social cost would be the lower upward-slopig curve.

3.3.

STRICT LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE COMPARED

I now consider the private activity cost for a representative actor under strict
liability. Given that the actor takes care under the strict liability rule, the private
activity cost is a function of the cost of taking care, the depreciation cost of
activity, and the liability and losses suffered. Adopting the more cumbersome
expression (1), the private cost of A's activity under strict liability is
(6)

yCpi,~(y)

=y(x, +

6Q) +qA(1- qB)v + (1-qA)qB(v-v) + q~qBv-v) + v]).
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The third term in (6) is the liability expected by the actor under strict liability,
since he is liable even though he has taken care. The third component reflects
the expected costs in the scenario in which A causes the accident and B does
not cause it (in other words, A, though taking care, crashes into B, who may
have been parked at a red light). The fourth term is the direct loss suffered by
the actor, which is zero because he is compensated. This is the case in which B
causes the accident and A does not. The fifth term shows the scenario in
which both cause the accident (A and B, though both acting with care, crash
their cars into each other). In the fifth term, A receives full compensation for
his loss, but must pay for B's loss.' 3 Simplifying, the private cost of A's activity
under strict liability is
(7)

yCriv(y) = y(x, + 6(y) +

qAv).

A similar argument allows us to see that the private activity cost to A under
negligence is
(8)

yCriv(y) = y(x, + 6(y) +

qBv).

These expressions indicate that the private activity cost to an actor differ in
intuitively plausible ways under strict liability and under negligence. Under
strict liability, the activity cost to A is a function of his own likelihood of
causing an injury to B. Under negligence, A's activity cost is a function of B's
likelihood of causing an injury to A.
While it has become common to describe strict liability as a rule that regulates
activity levels, these expressions show that both rules regulate activity levels.
They do so in different ways. Under strict liability, an actor will have a stronger
incentive to reduce his activity level, because of the threat of liability, as the level
of risk he externalizes to other actors increases. Under negligence, the actor will
have a stronger incentive to reduce his activity level, because he will suffer an
uncompensated injury, as the level of risk externalized by other actors increases.14
13 The fifth term raises the issue of comparative causation, see Parisi and Fon (2004). If there is
only one victim in the model, then that victim's loss could be apportioned among the two parties
according to some principle of comparative causation. The simplicity of this paper's model
makes it ideal for studying the practical implications of comparative causation.
14 The point that both strict liability and negligence regulate activity levels is made in Landes
and Posner (1987:69). Landes and Posner note that strict liability fails to control the activity level
of the victim, while negligence does. However, Landes and Posner deal with a simple model of
injurers and victims, which is inadequate for analyzing the function of strict liability in some
settings. This analysis differs from theirs by identifying relative risk externalization as the reason
that the rules have predictable effects on activity levels. The remaining analysis in the text
explores the different implications of this approach.
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Indeed, a simple proposition follows from the foregoing.
If qA > qB, holding A sticty Rable is preferable to using the neghgence rule in
regulating the activity level ofA. If however, qA q, strict Rabi§ty is not preferable
to neghgence. In simpler terms, if A externadkes more risk to others than they
externake to him, strct Rabik4 is preferable to neghgence. However, if there is a
reciorocalexchange of rsk between A and B, or i B externaiZes more risk than
does A, holding A strictly kable is not preferable, as a method of regulating A's
activiy level choice, to the neghgence rule.
Another proposition, which is both simple and startling, follows.
If there is reciorocalexchange of risk between A and B (qA = q), strictRabiity and
neghgenceprovide the same incentivesfor care andfor activiy level choices.
The intuition supporting this last claim is easy to state. Since everyone takes
care both under strict liability and under negligence, the only differences
between the two regimes will appear in the consequences associated with the
allocation of liability. Given that the marginal costs of taking care and of capital
exhaustion are the same under both rules, differences in activity level choices
will be driven by differences in the allocation of liability. Under negligence, in
choosing the scale at which you will engage in an activity, you need only
consider (in addition to care and capital costs) the costs of injuries to yourself
caused by others who took care. Under strict liability, you will be compensated
for injuries, so in choosing the scale at which you will engage in an activity, you
need only consider (in addition to care and capital costs) the expected liability
payments to others from accidents you cause even though you are taking care.
If risks are reciprocal, these costs are the same.' 5
Under strict liability, the privately optimal activity level will be determined by
equating the marginal private benefit with the marginal private cost of activity.
On the benefit side, A will consider only the external benefits conferred on
him by B, not the benefits that he confers on B. Thus, A's privately optimal
activity level choice under strict liability will be 53, which satisfies:
(9)

x,+ 8(yS) + qAv +

'(s) = b(

) + wBz + ysb'(y).

15 In the case of N actors, we should compare the risk externalized by A to that of the average

of the remaining actors:
N-1

qA

_

-1

Reciprocal risk generation among the remaining actors implies a low variance among the qi terms.
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The left hand side is the private marginal cost to A of activity under strict
liability, the right hand side is the private marginal benefit to A of activity.
Under negligence, the privately optimal activity level will again be determined
by equating the marginal private benefit of activity with its private marginal
cost. Thus, under negligence, A's privately optimal activity level will bej j,
which satisfies:
(10) x, + 8(j)

+ qBv +

j

8'(y,)=b(YJ)+ wBz + j b'(5J).

It is straightforward to show that the private activity level choice of A is higher
under negligence than under strict liability if and only if q > qB (see Figure 2).
Of course, A's activity level choice is the same under strict liability and under
negligence if q = qB.
The reciprocal nature of liability rules is evident in the marginal conditions
just described. Under strict liability, A, when choosing his level of activity, is
concerned with his liability for the risk he externalizes to others, even when he
is taking care. Under negligence, A is concerned with the risk externalized by
others to him. Thus, if A externalizes more risk than B and the negligence rule
applies to accidents, A will be encouraged to choose a higher level of activity
than he would choose under strict liability, while B simultaneously will be
encouraged to choose a lower level of activity than he would choose under the
strict liability rule. Where there is asymmetry in risk externalization, negligence
causes high risk-externalizers to increase their activity levels while low riskexternalizers decrease their activity levels.

3.4. COMPARING PRIVATE TO SOCIAL ACTIVITY INCENTIVES
The socially optimal activity level choice equates the marginal social cost of
activity with its marginal social benefit. This is described by equation (5). The
privately optimal activity level choice equates the marginal private cost of
activity with its marginal private benefit. For the case of strict liability, this is
described by (9). For the case of negligence, the privately optimal activity level
choice is described by (10). Since q + qB > q, and q + q > qB, it would
appear that both strict liability and negligence are inadequate from a social
perspective as regulators of activity levels. That is, since both strict liability and
negligence fail to fully internalize the marginal social costs of an extra unit of
activity, one might jump to the conclusion that both rules fail to give actors an
incentive to adopt the socially desirable level of activity (Edlin and Karaca-Mandic,
2006; Shavell 1980).
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Figure 2: Privately Optimal Activity Choices Under Strict Liability
and Under Negligence

But that conclusion would be premature. Consider strict liability. Although
strict liability fails to fully internalize the marginal social cost of activity, it is
also true that the actor may fail to take into account the full marginal social
benefit of his activity.
qrv

+

As Figure 2 illustrates, the marginal social cost curve, x, + 8 ) + q7 +

+

y'(y), is to the left of the marginal private cost curve under strict liability, X,

8 ) +
oAv
+y'(y). This is because the actor, anticipating full compensation,
discounts the harm to himself from increasing his level of activity. However,
the marginal social benefit curve, b&) + VA.Z + wZ +b'%), is to the right of the
actor's marginal private benefit curve, by) + w. +b'%). In other words, the
multiplier that applies to externalized risk also applies to externalized benefits.
This implies that it is ambiguous, a priori, whether private activity level choices
under strict liability are greater than the socially optimal level.
The implications of benefit externalization should be considered along with
those of risk externalization. In the previous part, it was demonstrated that if
there is a reciprocal exchange of risk between A and B (qA = q), then strict
liability is not preferable to the negligence rule - both have the same effects on
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activity levels. In this part, it is demonstrated that even if A externalizes more
risk than does B, it still does not follow that strict liability should be preferred
to negligence on welfare grounds. To determine whether strict liability is
socially preferable to negligence requires some comparison of risk
externalization and benefit externalization.
Four general scenarios immediately invite inspection: (1) qA > qB, WA > WB
(2) qA > q , WA
";B(3) qA qB, WA > B; (4) qA q q, WA B ".In the first,
actor A externalizes both costs and benefits to a higher degree than the typical
actor in the rest of the population. In the second, A externalizes more risk than
is the norm, and is the same or less than the norm in terms of benefit
externalization. In the third, A externalizes no more risk than the norm, but
externalizes more benefit than the typical actor. In the fourth, A externalizes
no additional risk, and no additional benefit relative to the norm.
The scenario in which strict liability is most likely to improve welfare is the
second, in which the actor externalizes more risk than the norm but no
additional benefit. In this case, negligence will clearly fail to provide the proper
activity level incentives. And since the actor does not externalize additional
benefit, there is no reason not to use liability in order to tax his activity.
The scenario in which the actor externalizes no additional risk, but does
externalize additional benefits, is one in which the ideal legal rule would
provide a subsidy in order to encourage the activity. One way in which the law
could provide such a subsidy would be to relieve the actor of a duty to take
care. Of course, an actor who is relieved of the duty to take care would set his
care level at zero, which increases the risk of harm. This suggests that the most
likely subsidy provided through the law - relieving an actor of the duty of care
- will be limited to a narrow set of circumstances in which the increased risk of
harm is slight relative to the gains from encouraging the underlying activity (in

terms of the model,pA

qA, qA
qB, and WA
B).
The following table provides a rough summary of the implications of this
model

wA > wB

wA < wB

qA > qB

Negligence (probably)

Strict Liability

qB

Subsidy (e.g., no duty)

Negligence

qA

This table suggests that subsidy and strict liability (taxation) rules are likely to be
rare in comparison to negligence rules. Negligence rules are likely to predominate
because they are efficient when risks are roughly reciprocal and when
externalized benefits are roughly the same as externalized costs. Reciprocal
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exchanges of risks or symmetrical risk-benefit externalization are likely to be
observed more often than non-reciprocal exchanges because communities are
likely to form around activities that cross-externalize similar risks.

3.5. EXTENSION TO MARKET ACTIVITIES
To this point I have considered accidents between strangers. Now I extend the
model to consider market activities. Obviously, people who interact in the
market are often strangers. But the difference between the market setting and
other settings is that there is usually an opportunity, in the market setting, for
the potential participants in an accident to bargain about the externalized costs
(and benefits) before the accident occurs.
To describe the market setting, I will re-label the terms used before. Lety
represent the number of units of some item - e.g., widgets. Let A be the seller
and B be the buyer. The activity social cost schedule, expression (3), now
represents the social cost of offering p. The activity social benefit schedule,
expression (4), now represents the social benefit of obtainingp.
There are several different types of market transaction. The most common is
the goods market - e.g., involving transactions between consumers and sellers of
widgets. An alternative model is that of the labor market, where sellers of labor
(workers) contract with buyers of labor (employers). Yet another model is that of
the land market. I will focus here on the goods market and consider special
features of the labor and land markets at the conclusion of this discussion.
In a world of pure barter, costs and benefits could easily be cross-externalized in
the sense studied earlier. If I trade arrowheads with you in return for beef, we may
expose each other to a risk of harm. The arrowhead I give you may be faulty. The
beef you give me in exchange may be contaminated. If the risks are reciprocal,
strict liability and negligence lead to the same incentives for care and activity levels.
Introducing money dramatically reduces the risk that the buyer will externalize
risk to the seller. This is perhaps the key reason money reduces the transaction
costs of the market, and increases social welfare relative to a barter system.
Assume that the likelihood the buyer causes harm to the seller is now zero, i.e.,
qB = 0. Assume in addition, that there are no external benefits in the transaction,
all benefits are observed by the parties and taken into account in their contract.
Under these assumptions, the activity social cost schedule becomes
(11)

yCsoc(y) = y(x, + 6(y) + qAv)-

The social cost of selling y widgets is the cost of taking care in design,
production, and distribution; the cost of design, production, and distribution;
and the expected cost of harm to buyers.
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Since risks are not cross-externalized by buyers, the analysis to this point
seems to suggest that strict liability of the seller is the best rule. The reason is
that the activity private cost schedule, under a negligence rule, is
(12)

yCpriv(y) = y(x, + 6(y)),

and since the private cost schedule of the seller does not include the externalized
risk component, sellers will sell their goods at prices that do not reflect the risk.
This, in turn, suggests that the market outcome is likely to be one in which the
goods are over-consumed relative to the social optimum (Polinsky, 1980).
However, the conclusion that the market results in over-consumption is not
necessarily valid. The market outcome is determined in part by the demand
schedule, which itself is derived from the activity benefit schedule. If buyers
can observe the risk connected to consuming the product, they will take it into
account when considering their benefits. If buyers can observe the risk
component, the activity (or consumption) private benefit schedule becomes
(13)

yBp,j(y) = y(b(y) - qAv),

because the buyer discounts the benefit from consumption by the expected loss
from injury. Given this, strict liability and negligence lead to the same
consumption levels (Buchanan, 1970). To see this clearly in terms of the model, A's
privately optimal activity level choice under negligence is y,, which satisfies:
(14)

x, + 6(5y) + 5 6'(5y) = b(5y) - qAv + j3b'( J ).

The left hand side is the private marginal cost of activity to A and the right
hand side is the private marginal benefit. Under strict liability, A's optimal
activity level choice satisfies:
(15)

x,+ 6( ,) + qAv+

6'(

) =b(')

+ 5,b'(3).

Since these equations are the same, the activity level (or, equivalently,
consumption level) choices under strict liability and under negligence will be
the same (i.e., 5

J5). If the buyer misperceives the risk of consuming the

product, strict liability and negligence may not lead to the same consumption
levels (Spence, 1977). In particular, if the buyer under-perceives the risk, he will
over-consume the product relative to the social optimum; and if he overperceives the risk, he will under-consume the product. In both scenarios, strict
liability would generate optimal consumption levels.
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As a general matter, the equivalence of strict liability and negligence in terms
of their effects on consumption levels when buyers accurately perceive risks
should depend on whether the risk component is created in the design,
production, or distribution stage of the supply chain. Designs, as well as their
risk characteristics, are often easy to observe by potential buyers. Hazards
created in the production and distribution processes, are comparatively less
observable. One can look at a convertible car and tell immediately that it will
not prevent you from being ejected during a roll-over accident. However,
staring at a convertible car will not tell you whether the mechanics assembled
or tested components carefully.
Now consider the case in which benefits are externalized from the seller to the
buyer. In most cases, benefit externalization should not be observed. Sellers
have every incentive to find a way to earn revenue for every benefit conferred
on someone by their product. But there are important counterexamples. For
example, consider vaccines. By reducing the spread of a disease, a vaccine can
provide external benefits to buyers and to the general population. It follows
from the foregoing (see Figure 2) that even if buyers under-perceive the risks,
strict liability may not be socially desirable.
Another example of benefit externalization by sellers is provided by
newspaper or other information-disseminating products, such as the internet.
Information is a public good, which means that benefits are provided beyond
the group of immediate buyers. A strict liability rule would probably push
consumption below the socially desirable level.
This analysis applies easily to the labor market setting, where the buyer is the
employer and seller is the worker. Again, the process of risk creation can occur at
the design or operational stage. Hazards created at the design stage, such as the
decision to use a relatively risky technology rather than a safer alternative, are often
observable to all participants in the enterprise. As a general rule, design-specific
hazards should be relatively more observable than operation-specific hazards.
In the case of the land market, risks are often associated with fixed features of
the landscape. A person may purchase a parcel of land at the bottom of steep
hill, where there is an obvious risk that boulders at the top of the hill will roll
down onto the parcel. Alternatively, a person may purchase a building located
at a busy intersection of two roads, taking on the risk from injuries to the
property caused by passing traffic. In these examples, the purchaser is aware of
the risk and discounts the purchase price accordingly. Given this, strict liability
and negligence have the same effects on purchaser's location decisions.
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4. APPLICATIONS TO LAW
Strict liability is appropriate on welfare grounds, under this model, only when
the potential tortfeasor externalizes more risk than the typical actor and also
does not externalize additional benefit. I will argue below that this general
picture is consistent with the law on strict liability.
4.1. STRICT LIABLITY FOR DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
The clearest application of this model is in the context of strict liability for
"abnormally dangerous activities". The law in this area has its roots in the
famous Rylands v. Fletcherdecision, which has been codified, more or less, in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 520 of the Second Restatement
provides the following:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the
following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on and;
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.
The function of the Restatement test is easy to understand under the model
presented here. The first three components of this test ask, in essence, whether
the risk externalized by the actor, even when he is taking care, is greater than
the norm - in other words, whether qA > qr. In other words, in terms of the
cost-curve diagram in Figure 1, the test asks whether holding the actor strictly
liable, rather than liable only for negligence, would lead to a substantial upward
shift in the private marginal cost schedule for the actor's activity. If so, these
factors suggest strict liability is appropriate.
Examples of activities for which the externalized risk is relatively high are easy to
suggest. The classic example is blasting in a residential area. Homeowners impose
a minimal risk on a construction crew engaged in blasting. However, even when
the construction crew is acting with reasonable care, it imposes a much greater
risk on homeowners from debris and concussions caused by blasting.
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1221

172 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

4:1, 2008

-

The fourth component of Restatement 520 goes to the question of
reciprocity. If the defendant's activity is one of common usage, then clearly
there is a reciprocal exchange of risk between the activity of the actor and the
activity of a representative member of the population or community - in other
words, qA = qB. Consider, for example, the activity of driving a car. Since many
people own cars in the United States, the risk imposed by car driver A is
reciprocated by the risks imposed on A by others.
The fifth component of Restatement 520 - inappropriateness to place
poses the same question as the fourth component but from the opposite
starting point. While the fourth component asks if the risk is reciprocated, the
fifth asks if the risk is not reciprocated. If most people who live in a
community would judge a certain activity as "inappropriate," it follows that the
activity must be one that is not commonly carried out within the community of
interest. If the residual risk associated with the activity is high and it is
inappropriate in this sense, then clearly it is a case in which the actor
externalizes risk that is not reciprocated in general.
The fifth component has a second implication which is less clear on its face,
but clearly implied by the model of this paper. An activity might have a high
residual risk, and yet may also have a high external benefit. Having a fire
company station located in your community may impose additional risk - of
noise and of harm from fire trucks racing down your street - but it also
provides the additional security of proximity to firemen. Thus, even if the
activity externalizes a relatively high level of risk (qA > q), strict liability may be
inappropriate if the external benefits are also relatively high (wA > WB). If both
risks and benefits externalized are high, the activity should not be deemed
inappropriate for the place in which it is carried on.16
The sixth component of Restatement 520 asks for a direct comparison of
the activity's "value to the community" and its dangerous attributes. The
language is obviously vague and probably incapable of precise specification.
However, in terms of this model, the language appears to have a clear meaning.
The court should attempt some qualitative assessment of externalized risk and
externalized benefit. If externalized risks seem to outweigh externalized benefit,
then strict liability would be desirable on this score. 7 The sixth component
16

One can think of this portion of the Restatement test as an implied assumption of risk rule.

If the conditions are satisfied (qA > qB, &A > &B), then one could say that the plaintiff assumed

the risk because the benefits externalized by the defendant's activity exceeded the costs.
17 Conversely, if externalized benefits exceed externalized risks, then strict liability is
inappropriate. For a case in which the court recognized that strict liability would be inappropriate
because the externalized benefits from the defendant's activity exceeded the externalized risks,
see Rikards v. Lothian, [1913] A.C. 263. In Rikards, the plaintiff brought a strict liability claim on
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may seem redundant in light of my description of the second function of the
fifth component. However, the sixth component is not redundant given the
high likelihood that the fifth component would be narrowly viewed as nothing
more than a reciprocity test.
The model of this paper provides an economic justification for the
reasoning adopted in Rylands v. Fletcher. The defendant stored a large quantity of
water in a reservoir on his property. The water escaped through ancient mine
shafts under his property, flooding a neighbor's property. The court argued
that storing a large quantity of water imposed an unusually high risk on
neighboring landowners, with no reciprocal risk imposed by them and no
offsetting benefit externalized to them. The court's rationale for strict liability is
consistent with the implications of this paper's model. Moreover, the model
here suggests a specific interpretation of the language used by the Rylands court.
Rylands announces a rule of strict liability for "non-natural" uses of property
that "escape" and cause damage to others, provided that the damage is the
"natural consequence" of the escape and that the escape is not due to the
plaintiffs fault. The model of this paper implies that "non-natural use" in
Rylands should be understood to mean that the defendant brought something
not naturally there onto his property and thereby imposed a non-reciprocated
substantial risk on adjacent landowners which was not offset by some
externalized benefit. The term "natural consequences" limits liability to harms
that are foreseeable in relation to the risk generated. Lastly, the reference to the
plaintiffs fault immunizes the defendant when the harm is caused in large part
by the plaintiffs conduct.
The theory of this paper, which focuses on risk and benefit externalization
rather than activity-level effects, is much easier to reconcile with the outcome
of Rylands than the analyses of Shavell and Posner. Consider again the facts of
Rylands and ask the following question: would strict liability be superior to
negligence in terms of its effects on activity level choices? One could just as
easily argue "no" as to argue "yes". It probably would not have been clear that
strict liability would have caused a visible change in the water storage decisions
of landowners in the period in which Rylands was decided. The technological
alternatives probably were not obvious at the time. If the Rylands court had
attempted a direct analysis of activity level incentives, it might well have
decided that strict liability is inappropriate. The approach suggested by this
paper's model, as well as the law, focuses on externalization of risk (and

the theory that the defendant's decision to supply water to the building he owned imposed an
extraordinary on tenants. The court held that water supply is a reasonable activity that should not
be subjected to strict liability.
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benefit) with little effort to analyze activity level incentives directly. As a
method of explaining the law, and a guideline for courts to follow, the analysis
of activity level incentives is probably ineffective.
4.2. NUISANCE
This model applies nuisances, such as an activity that blows a plume of black
smoke over your property. Even when carried on with care, the typical
nuisance externalizes harm that is unreciprocated by other actors (qA > q).
Indeed, the analysis just carried out for dangerous activities can be carried out
with only minimal changes for nuisances. The first three factors of Restatement
S520 would ask, in the case of a nuisance, whether the interference or
annoyance to adjacent landowners would occur even if the activity were carried
on with reasonable care. Again, this is equivalent to asking whether the activity
externalizes more harm than is the norm in its area of operation. The fourth
factor of 520, applied to the case of a nuisance, would ask whether the activity
is one of common usage. If, for example, everyone in the community burns
their leaves in the fall, creating plumes of smoke that cross over the property of
neighbors, then the harm externalized by any particular leaf-burner is
reciprocated by the harms externalized by others within the community.1 8 The
sixth factor would ask whether the externalized risk is counterbalanced by a
gain to the community. For example, the occasional noise of a fire station
might be considered a nuisance were it not for the fact that the station also
benefits neighbors substantially.
This paper's model suggests that the six part test of Restatement 520 can be
used as a test for determining whether an activity is a nuisance, which would
help to clarify nuisance doctrine. Under this model, questions of reasonable
care would play virtually no role in the analysis of nuisances. 9
Even some of the narrower doctrines of nuisance law are easily explained
within this paper's model. Consider, for example, the rule excluding

18 Bamford v. Turn/ey, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (Ex. 1862) ("reciprocal nuisance...of a comparatively
trifling character" are not actionable).
19 The general concept of reasonableness is applicable, under this analysis, as long as it is used in
reference to the defendant's invasion, where reasonableness is determined by an examination of the
degree of reciprocity in risk externalization and the degree to which benefits are externalized by the
defendant's activity. However, the traditional "Learned Hand test" examination of the burden of
precaution relative to avoidable harms should not play a role in nuisance doctrine. The language of
Section 826 of the Second Restatement potentially confuses matters because it describes an
invasion as unreasonable if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct.
Confusion would be less likely if Section 826 referred instead to the utility of the actor's "activity."
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compensation under nuisance law to an ultra-sensitive plaintiff.2 0 In Sking
whether strict liability should be applied to the defendant, the key question, in
this model, is whether the defendant's externalized harms are different from
those of the typical actor, including the victim. In other words, the proper test
for strict liability under this paper's model focuses on the injurer's
externalization relative to background risk externalization, rather than the
victim's sensitivity. If the injurer's externalization was not substantially greater
than the background level of risk externalization, then strict liability should not
be applied to the injurer. This implication of the model easily resolves a case
such as Rogers v. Elott, in which the plaintiff brought suit against the local
church because he was unusually sensitive to the noise from the church's bell.
The court ruled against the plaintiff on the ground that nuisance law did not
provide compensation for ultra-sensitive plaintiffs. A more direct answer,
implied by this model, is that if the average person in the community was not
harmed by the church bell, then the ringing did not externalize substantially
2
more harm than the background level of externalization in the community. 1
The rule that "coming to the nuisance" is not always a defense is also easily
explained within this model. Consider the case of heterogeneous risks. Suppose
there is a range of background activity risks running from high to extremely
low. For example, some actors may be running factories that belch out large
plumes of smoke, while other actors may be engaged in activities that
externalize little risk to others, such as living in a house. A community might
start off, in year one, with 99 factories and 1 home owner. In this setting, the
harm externalized by the factory is not substantially different from the
background externalization by others. A nuisance suit by the homeowner
against the factory should not prevail, which is consistent with the law.2 2 Over
time, the community may change. Suppose by year twenty, there are 2 factories
and 98 home owners. At this stage, the harm externalized by one factory is far
in excess of the background externalization by other actors - treating this
background externalization as a weighted average over all actors in the
community. The home owner's nuisance suit against the factory should not be
23
barred by the "coming to the nuisance" rule.

Rqgers v. Eot, 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888).
Alternatively, one could defend the decision on the ground that the benefits of the church's
activity were also substantial.
22 E.g., Bove v. Donner-HannaCoke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (App. Div. 1932).
23
Ensign v. Wals, 34 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948).
20
21
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4.3. NEGLIGENCE
In the Rylands decision, the court noted that the negligence rule applies in areas in
which there is a roughly reciprocal exchange of risk among actors or where risks
and benefits are symmetrically externalized. The court referred to traffic on the
roads and on the seas as examples. And across the board, where the residual risks
externalized by actors are roughly equal and small, the negligence rule applies.
Another example noted in Rylands is that of an owner of a business near a
busy street. Although the business may not be throwing off risk onto nearby
traffic, it can be said that the business settled on its location in full view of the
risks, paying a price for the location which reflected those risks. The model of
this paper implies that activity level (in this case, land acquisition) incentives are
not altered by switching from negligence to strict liability.
In this model, negligence and strict liability provide the same incentives when
there is a reciprocal exchange of risk (or in contractual settings in which the risks
are apparent), 24 So there is no social advantage to be gained by replacing the
negligence rule with strict liability. However, this also raises the question why
courts have not randomly replaced the negligence rule with strict liability. In
other words, why does negligence remain the default rule in so many settings?
Several reasons can be offered. One is that for relatively small risks, it should
be clear that actors will be more attentive to potential harms to themselves
than to others. In addition, if we include a slight cost to bringing suit, there
would be some loss in the deterrence incentive by switching, in this model,
from negligence to strict liability when risks are small and reciprocal. These
deterrence-based reasons suggest a real-world preference for negligence as the
default rule. Strict liability would be preferable, given these considerations, only
when risk asymmetry suggests a potential for welfare to be enhanced by
holding high risk-externalizers strictly liable.
Another real-world reason for choosing negligence as the default rule is the
greater administrability of a liability rule based on care rather than one based on
causation. The negligence standard focuses on some untaken precaution that is
usually framed by the plaintiff (Grady, 1989). As some courts and commentators
have noted, 25 strict liability requires the court to determine which of several
causes should be assigned liability. Holmes (1881:90-92) argued that these questions
would force courts to resolve intractable problems.

24 The contract setting in which risk is apparent can be viewed as a special case satisfying the
risk reciprocity condition. When risks are apparent, and taken into account in contract terms,
there is no unusual level of externalization because risks have been internalized through contract.

25

BrowS v. Co/ns, 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
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The model in this paper simplifies the analysis of strict liability by assuming
identifiable causation. But in the real world causation is not always easy to identify,
which suggests an additional reason to restrict the scope of strict liability. Strict
liability should be limited to setting in which causation is easily established.
4.4. DUTY
This model suggests that there may be pockets of law in which legal rules are
designed either to subsidize the actor's activity or to prevent imposing liability
that would reduce activity levels too far below the socially optimal level. The
most commonly observed subsidy is relief from the duty to take care. Relieving
an actor of the duty to take care immunizes the actor from liability for
choosing not to take care.
Since relieving an actor of the duty to take care provides him an incentive to
set his care level at zero, we should observe this type of subsidy in narrow
settings. In particular, given that the risk of harm increases when an actor
reduces his care level, relief from the duty to take care should be observed in
those settings in which the increase in the risk of harm, induced by immunizing
the actor from liability, is likely to be slight. Subsidization, in the form of a
relaxed duty of care, should be observed when the external benefit of the
actor's activity is likely to be relatively large and the resultant increase in the
likelihood of harm is likely to be slight (
qA, qA -B,
A
w).
One example of an area in which actors are relieved of the duty to take care is
the rescue setting. Courts hold that a rescuer does not have a duty to take care
for his own safety. 26 This example fits well with the implication of this paper's
model. First, a rescuer obviously has a genetically-hardwired incentive to worry
about his own safety, even if he is going to be compensated in full for his
harms due to the negligent party. Relieving a rescuer of the duty to take care
for his own safety is unlikely to lead rescuers to abandon the survival instinct
and with it the incentive to take care for their own safety. Second, rescue is an
activity that most societies, throughout the ages, have considered heroic and
worthy of praise. Most societies have viewed rescue as an activity with
relatively large external benefits. Given these factors, rescue would appear,
under this model, to be an ideal activity to subsidize, and the law in fact
subsidizes the activity by relieving rescuers of the duty of self-care, although
they lose the subsidy if they are reckless.
In addition to rescue, there are other activities in which courts have relieved
actors of a duty of care. For example, landowners do not have a duty to take

26

Ecker v. Long IslandR.., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871), Wagnerv. Int'lKy. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
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care for trespassers. 27 The external benefit that is encouraged by this rule is not
as easy to see as in the case of rescue. However, imposing a duty of care for a
trespasser on a landowner would transfer part of the property's value to the
trespasser. In a low transaction-cost setting, there is no reason for the law to
effect such a transfer; the would-be trespasser can bargain and pay for the level
of care that he would like to see the landowner adopt. Given this, and given
the trespassers ability to avoid the harm by staying off the landowner's
property, the subsidy provided by the no duty rule in this setting is simply a
complement to the protection provided by trespass law to landowners.
Landowner liability law imposes different duties on landowners in the cases
of invitees and licensees. In the case of an invitee, typically a business visitor,
the landowner is liable for latent defects in the property even if the landowner
was not aware of them. In the case of a licensee, typically a social visitor, the
landowner is liable only for defects of which the landowner is aware. This
difference is justifiable, in terms of this paper's model, because licensees are
often in a position to become aware of the state of the landowner's property,
like the buyer who is aware of the risks of the seller's product (equations (13)(15)). Invitees, on the other hand, usually have no relationship with the
landowner that would allow them to become familiar with or to form a
relatively accurate prediction of the condition of his property. They are in the
same position as a buyer who is unaware of the risk characteristics of the
seller's product. Strict liability for latent defects corrects activity levels in the
invitee case, while it would be unnecessary in general in the licensee case.

4.5. MARKET TRANSACTIONS AND STRICT LIABILITY
Priest (1985) has raised important and troubling questions about the
foundations and modern practice of products liability law. Still, the model of
this paper provides an economic framework that is generally consistent with
the law. In general, products liability lawsuits fall into three categories:
manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn. Strict liability applies
to only the first category: manufacturing defect litigation. Design defect claims
are resolved under a risk-utility test that is similar in many respects to the
standard negligence test. Failure to warn disputes are resolved under the
traditional negligence test.
The assignment of liability rules (strict liability, negligence) across the categories
of product liability litigation is consistent with the predictions of this paper's
model. First, note that for mass-produced products today, risk externalization is
unilateral. The seller externalizes risk to the buyer, not the other way around.
27

See, e.g., Buch

v. Amory Manufacturing Co., 44 A.

809 (N.H. 1897).
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This immediately suggests that strict liability may be preferable to negligence.
The other key factor suggested by the model here is whether consumers are or
should be aware of the risk characteristics of the product. If they are aware, then
negligence and strict liability lead to equivalent outcomes.
Manufacturing defect claims involve errors or glitches of the manufacturing
process. Because of the manufacturing glitch, 1 out of every 1000 units of the
product may be defective in a way that is dangerous to the consumer. If
consumers are unaware of this risk, which is especially likely in the early stages
of the product's life cycle, the market outcome will be one in which there is too
much consumption of the product relative to the social optimum. The strict
liability rule that applies to manufacturing defect claims corrects what would
otherwise be a market failure.
Of course, even this correction is limited to the settings in which overconsumption of risk is likely. When the product is likely to externalize benefits,
strict liability is rejected. For example, although many vaccine cases are
resolved under the statutory scheme set up by the National Child Vaccine
Injury Act,2 8 the Second Restatement classifies them as "unavoidably unsafe"
products exempt from the rule of strict liability. 2 9 In this special case, the law

follows the prediction of this model by rejecting the strict liability principle
because of the positive externalities associated with consumption.
Design defect claims involve design features that expose consumers to the
risk of physical harm. The key difference, in terms of this model, between
design and manufacturing defects is that the former type of defect is more
observable to the consumer. Liability for design defects is not strict.
Manufacturers are held liable only for choosing a design that exposes the
consumer to an inordinate risk given the design's benefits relative to some
safer alternative. Given its effort to balance costs and benefits, the risk-utility
test applied to design defects is closer to a negligence rule than a strict liability
rule. The risk-utility test is essentially a negligent design theory, and there were
examples of such claims in the common law long before the introduction of
products liability doctrine.30
The failure to warn category serves as an additional example that strict liability
is not the general rule in products liability. The law on failure to warn applies to
design defect claims. Suppose, to set aside the case of negligence in design, the
product has a non-negligent design, and the consumer sues solely because the
seller failed to warn of risk characteristics. The manufacturer is not strictly
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa et seq.
29 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A comment k (1966).

30 See, e.g., Cooley v. Puble Service Co., 10 A.2d 675 (N.H. 1940).
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liable for failing to warn of a potential risk connected to the design. In this
respect the law, consistent with this paper's model, appears to reflect a
background assumption that consumers are generally aware of the risks
generated by many ordinary products.
In the labor market setting, one could argue that risk externalization is
asymmetric or unilateral in many settings. The employer may choose or design
a worksite that presents a risk of physical harm to employees, but employees
seldom do anything that poses a risk of physical or property harm to the
employer. Given this asymmetry in risk externalization, this paper's model
would seem to imply at first glance a preference for strict liability. However,
strict liability was not the rule of the common law; the liability of employers
was limited to their own negligence.
This can be justified in economic terms by the greater scope for employees to
gain a full understanding of the risks of the workplace and even to bargain over
those risks. Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Farnell argued that employees
would bargain for wage rates that reflect the risk characteristics of regular
features of the worksite. 31 If employees' perceptions of risk were relatively
accurate, strict liability could not improve upon the activity level incentives
provided by the negligence rule.

5. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a positive economic model of strict liability. The key
innovation of this model is the explicit incorporation of risk as a crossexternalized cost of activity, which is evident in many real world settings such
as transportation on the roads or on the seas. While the new model does not
necessarily upset the general conclusions of the Shavell-Posner analysis, it does
alter the analysis significantly. The framework of this paper provides a simpler
and more straightforward way of evaluating the justification for strict liability,
because it focuses on relative risk externalization rather than the ability of the
law to influence activity level choices. The model's implications fit closely with
the case law and doctrine on strict liability, negligence, and duty.

Fane!lv. Boston and Worcester Rail Road Corp., 4 Metcalf 49 (Mass. 1842).
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